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Abstract 
The Gini coefficient is the most popular inequality index.  It is based on the sum of pairwise absolute 
income differences, which can be viewed as taking a separate sum for each individual of the differences 
between his/her income and others’, and then adding up those separate sums.  The differences vis-à-vis 
people with lower income can be used to construct an individual’s advantage, while the differences with 
respect to people with higher incomes generate the individual’s deprivation.  Deprivation and advantage 
can be weighted differently, producing a whole family of “Gini admissible” personal inequality indexes. 
The population average of any one of the latter equals the Gini coefficient.  The properties of the personal 
inequality indexes explain the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to transfers in different ranges of the 
income distribution.  They also throw light on individual views of secular changes in income distribution 
interesting for their own sake. For example, throughout the change from a traditional to a modern 
economy that gives rise to the Kuznets curve, those in the traditional sector believe that inequality is 
constantly increasing while those in the modern sector believe the opposite.  Personal views about 
polarization and rising inequality, as seen in most high income countries in recent decades, are also 
illuminated. 
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I. Introduction* 
 
The Gini coefficient has a natural interpretation as the mean of personal inequality assessments.  While 
that fact is fairly obvious, it was not emphasized in the original work by Gini (1914) and has not been 
highlighted since.  This paper shows that this straightforward interpretation throws important light on the 
properties of the Gini coefficient.  It also allows us to better understand individual reactions, as well as 
that of the Gini coefficient, to secular changes in income distribution.  The latter include the transition 
from a traditional to a modern economy analyzed by Kuznets (1955), and the polarization and rising 
inequality seen in recent decades in the U.S. and many other countries.  Personal assessments of even the 
direction of change in inequality may differ between people at different income levels.  These results 
suggest that our understanding of inequality measurement can be enriched by studying what it may mean 
at the personal level.   
The Gini coefficient can be defined or interpreted in many ways (Yitzhaki, 1998).  For our purposes the 
most useful is that it equals one half the mean difference divided by the mean.  For a finite population, the 
Gini coefficient can be found by taking the sum of all all pairwise absolute income differences, S, 
converting to an average  and normalizing by the mean.  S can be written as the sum across individuals i = 
1, .., n of their individual sums of pairwise differences with all other individuals, ௜ܵ.  The latter can be 
used as the basis for a personal inequality index whose average across the population is the Gini 
coefficient.  For each individual, ௜ܵ is composed of the sum of differences with higher incomes plus the 
sum of differences with lower incomes.  Following Yitzhaki (1979) the sum of differences with higher 
incomes may be used to define the individual’s deprivation.  That concept is complemented by the 
individual’s advantage, derived from the sum of differences with respect to lower incomes.1  Summing 
deprivation or advantage across the whole population produces the same total (Yitzhaki, 1979).  An 
implication is that a weighted average of deprivation and advantage, as well as an unweighted average, 
will generate a personal inequality index that will equal the Gini coefficient when averaged across the 
population.  This means that there is a whole family of “Gini admissible” personal inequality indexes or 
GAPIIs.  If societies choose to base overall inequality measurement on an average of individual 
assessments they may all use the same inequality index, that is the Gini coefficient, at the aggregate level 
even if they differ in the weight their members place on advantage vs. deprivation. 2   
The personal inequality indexes discussed here may be regarded from a “top down” or “bottom up” 
viewpoint.  A GAPII could be interpreted as showing how a social planner would measure inequality at 
the personal level.  This is a “top down” view.  An alternative, “bottom up”, view is that individuals, for 
whatever reason, assess inequality using a GAPII.  Why might individuals do so?   One possibility is that 
                                                            
*Thanks are due to Michael Hoy, Stephen Jenkins and Shlomo Yitzhaki for helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper.  Responsibility for any errors or omissions is of course my own. 
1 Yitzhaki (1979) used the term “relative deprivation”, which was introduced by Runciman (1966) to refer to any 
case in which some members of a reference group felt deprived compared to other members of their group.  
“Deprivation” is used here simply because it is shorter.  Fehr and Schmidt (1999) referred to the same concept as 
“disadvantageous inequality”, but the term deprivation still dominates in the literature.  Yitzhaki (1979) used the 
term “satisfaction” rather than “advantage”.  “Advantage” is used here as a more neutral term.      
2 It may seem too strong to assume that all individuals in a society would place the same weight on advantage vs. 
deprivation.  With continuous income distributions this assumption could be relaxed to allow weights to differ 
across individuals as long as those differences were independent of income.    
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they could have interdependent utility functions, such as that proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
which suggest the use of a GAPII.  But one may also appeal to bounded rationality.  The difference 
between incomes is an unobjectionable indicator of inequality between two people (especially if 
considered in the light of mean income).  Although we know there are many alternatives, people may 
simply think, by extension, that the average of such differences provides the natural basis for measuring 
inequality when there are more than two people.  That conclusion could be reinforced by information and 
computing constraints.  As shown in this paper, in order to compute the value of a GAPII the individual 
only needs to know the fraction of the population with income above him and the average incomes of 
those above and below him.  While it is not reasonable to suppose that each individual knows everyone’s 
income, he/she might be able to make a serviceable guess at these three quantities.  
This paper is related to the large literature on individual attitudes toward inequality.  A portion of the 
literature attempts to measure attitudes within narrow reference groups, e.g. co-workers or members of 
the same occupation.   In that context people tend to be averse to deprivation but to like advantage.  As 
Clark and D’Ambrosio (2015) point out, in the income distribution literature the usual reference group is 
broader.  In that context, following Yitzhaki (1979, 1982) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the general 
expectation has been that people will be averse to both deprivation and advantage.  There are now a few 
empirical and experimental studies that have estimated aversion to deprivation and/or advantage with 
broader reference groups.  Using the German SOEP survey data, D’Ambrosio and Frick (2007) find 
strong aversion to deprivation (but do not report on attitudes to advantage).  Cojocaru (2014) finds 
significant aversion to both advantage and deprivation using a survey of 27 transition countries.  In 
experiments with subjects who played a sequential public goods game, Teyssier (2012) found that 40% 
were averse to both advantage and deprivation while 18% were averse to neither.  While these studies do 
not indicate a difference in aversion to deprivation vs. advantage, neural studies find that brain activity 
reacts more strongly to deprivation and some authors presume that aversion to advantage is likely weaker 
than aversion to deprivation (Clark and D’Ambrosio, 2015).    
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  For expositional simplicity we start by working with the 
case in which advantage and deprivation are equally weighted.  Section II defines the personal inequality 
index and derives some of its basic properties.  In Section III we then explore how the behavior of this 
index helps to explain the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to income changes in different ranges of a 
distribution. The analysis is extended to allow unequal weighting of deprivation and advantage in Section 
IV, which shows that the main insights of the previous two sections survive this generalization.  How the 
personal assessments of inequality vary with income is discussed in Section V and the behavior of those 
assessments during period of secular change in income distribution is examined in Section VI.  Section 
VII concludes.  
 
II. Gini-admissible Personal Inequality Indexes: Base Case  
In this section we see how the Gini coefficient can be defined as the average value across individuals of a 
particular personal inequality index (PII), and begin to examine the properties of the latter.  We do not 
seek a basis for the PII in individuals’ personal or social preferences.  Our interest is confined to 
investigating the implications for personal inequality assessments if individuals use a Gini admissible PII, 
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or GAPII.  A PII will be termed Gini admissible if the Gini coefficient can be found by taking a simple 
average of the values of that PII across individuals. 
The Gini coefficient for an income distribution equals one half the mean difference divided by the mean, 
as we see in:  
ሺ1ሻ								ܩ ൌ 12݊ଶݕത෍෍หݕ௜ െ ݕ௝ห
௡
௝ୀଵ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ൌ ܵ2݊ଶݕത 
where ݕ௜ is the income of individual i, ݕത is mean income, n > 1, ݕଵ ൑ ݕଶ ൑ ⋯ ൑ ݕ௡, S is the sum of 
differences, and ܵ/݊ଶ is the mean difference.3   
A natural but previously overlooked interpretation is that G is the mean value across individuals of a 
particular GAPII, ܩ௜: 
ሺ2ሻ							ܩ ൌ 	 1݊෍ܩ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
where   
ሺ3ሻ							ܩ௜ ൌ 12݊ݕത෍หݕ௜ െ ݕ௝ห ൌ
௜ܵ
2݊ݕത
௡
௝ୀଵ
 
and ௜ܵ is the sum of differences for individual i.  Equation (3) can be rewritten: 
ሺ4ሻ								ܩ௜ ൌ 12݊ݕത ൣ݊௜
௟൫ݕ௜ െ ݕത௜௟൯ ൅ ݊௜௛൫ݕത௜௛ െ ݕ௜൯൧ 
where ݊௜௟ is the number of individuals with income less than or equal to ݕ௜, excluding individual i, and ݊௜௛ 
is the number with income strictly greater than ݕ௜, so that ݊௜௟ ൅ ݊௜௛ ൌ ݊ െ 1.4   ݕത௜௟ and ݕത௜௛ are mean income 
among those with income less than or equal to	ݕ௜, excluding i, and strictly greater than ݕ௜ respectively.   
Let ܪ௜ be the set of all j such that ݕ௝ > 	ݕ௜ , and ܮ௜ be the set of all j excluding i such that ݕ௝  ൑ 	ݕ௜. 
Equation (4) can be expressed as: 
ሺ4′ሻ								ܩ௜ ൌ 	 12ݕത ሺܣ௜ ൅ ܦ௜ሻ 
where: 
                                                            
3 As mentioned earlier, the Gini coefficient can be expressed in many different ways (Yitzhaki, 1998). This is one of 
the two principal forms in which it was originally set out in Gini (1914), and is the most convenient for our 
discussion.     
4 The choice to include individuals who have the same income as i in the lower group rather than in the higher group 
is arbitrary but does not affect the results in any significant way.    
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ሺ5݅ሻ							ܣ௜ ൌ ݊௜
௟
݊ 	൫ݕ௜ െ ݕത௜
௟൯ ൌ 1݊෍ሺݕ௜ െ ݕ௝ሻ௝∈௅೔
	 
ሺ5݅݅ሻ					ܦ௜ ൌ ݊௜
௛
݊ ൫ݕത௜
௛ െ ݕ௜൯ ൌ 1݊ ෍ሺݕ௝ െ ݕ௜ሻ௝∈ு೔
 
ܦ௜ is the discrete analogue of the measure of relative deprivation for an individual, which we will refer to 
simply as deprivation, proposed by Yitzhaki (1979) for a continuous distribution.  It equals the average 
shortfall of i’s income below the income of those who are better off, weighted by the fraction of the 
population in the latter group.  Equation (4΄) shows that ܩ௜is the simple average of ܦ௜ and a 
complementary measure, ܣ௜, normalized by the mean.  We will say that ܣ௜ represents individual i’s 
advantage compared to people with lower income.  Thus from the individual perspective inequality 
consists of both deprivation with respect to the better off and advantage over the worse off.   
While ܩ௜ is a natural personal inequality index to associate with the Gini coefficient, it is not the only 
GAPII.  As mentioned earlier, and as shown in Section IV, one can define a more general class of GAPIIs 
that are based on a weighted average of ܣ௜ and ܦ௜.  ܩ௜ is a special case in which the weights on ܣ௜ and ܦ௜ 
are equal.     
From (4) we have: 
Proposition 1:  ܩ௜ is insensitive to a transfer of income within ܪ௜ or within ܮ௜ if the composition of 
neither group changes as a result of the transfer.   
The proposition follows from the fact that transfers of income confined either to ܪ௜ or ܮ௜ do not alter 
݊௜௟, 	ݕത௜௟	, ݊௜௛, or	ݕത௜௛ or any other term on the right-hand side of (4).  In terms of (4΄), as noted by Yitzhaki 
(1979) these transfers have no effect on advantage, ܣ௜, or on deprivation,	ܦ௜.  The insensitivity of ܩ௜	to 
such transfers means that it does not respect the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which is a 
cornerstone of the theory of aggregate inequality measurement.  That an aggregate index that respects the 
Pigou-Dalton principle can be built on the basis of personal indexes that violate the principle is striking.   
Sensitivity of ܩ௜ to a transfer of income between ܪ௜ and ܮ௜ 
What determines how sensitive ܩ௜ is to a transfer of income between ܪ௜	and ܮ௜?  Consider the transfer of 
a total amount R from ܪ௜	to ܮ௜. Note that such a transfer reduces both ܣ௜and ܦ௜ by R/n, as can be seen 
from (5) where ݊௜௟ሺݕ௜ െ ݕത௜௟ሻ and  ݊௜௛ሺݕത௜௛ െ ݕ௜ሻ both fall by R.  We will allow R to be negative, so this also 
handles the case of transfers from ܮ௜	to ܪ௜, which increase ܣ௜	and ܦ௜ by equal amounts.  Using  
																		߲ܣ௜߲ܴ ൌ
߲ܦ௜
߲ܴ ൌ
െ1
݊  
and from (4΄) we have: 
		ሺ6ሻ				డீ೔డோ ൌ െ
ଵ
௡௬ത  
which allows us to state: 
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Proposition 2: When income is transferred from a person with income strictly above ݕ௜ to someone with 
income strictly below ݕ௜, ܩ௜ falls, while if income is transferred from a person with income strictly below 
ݕ௜ to someone with income strictly above ݕ௜, ܩ௜ rises.  In both cases the change in ܩ௜ is proportional to the 
amount transferred and independent of ݕ௜. 
Note that this proposition implies that any given individual is equally sensitive to a transfer from the 
group above him to the group below, or vice versa.  In that sense, individuals are equally sensitive to 
redistribution that does not alter their own income.   
Sensitivity of ܩ௜ to a transfer affecting ݕ௜   
We also need to analyze those cases where distributional changes affect individual i’s own income. There 
are two situations to consider.  One is that of a transfer from i to another person j.  The other is that of a 
transfer from j to i.  We will consider them in turn.  In this analysis, and in the remainder of the paper 
unless indicated otherwise, we will assume ݕଵ ൏ ݕଶ ൏ ⋯ ൏ ݕ௡.  This assumption will simplify the 
analysis since, for example, it implies that when n is odd there is a unique individual with median income, 
ݕ௠௘ௗ, and half the remaining population has ݕ௜ < ݕ௠௘ௗ  while the other half have ݕ௜ > ݕ௠௘ௗ. 5  If n is even 
there is no individual with ݕ௜ = ݕ௠௘ௗ,	but ݕ௠௘ௗ, which is defined as the midpoint between ݕ௡/ଶ and 
ݕ௡/ଶାଵ, again divides the population into two sub-populations of equal size with incomes above and 
below the median.  
Transfer from i to j:  Let ݕ௜௢ and ݕ௝௢ be initial incomes and consider the effect on ܩ௜	of the transfer of a 
small amount r from individual i to individual j.  From (4) we obtain: 
Proposition 3a:  The effect on ܩ௜	of a small transfer in the amount of r from individual i to an individual 
j is given by: 
ሺ7݅ሻ									∆ܩ௜ 	ൌ 12݊ݕത ൣ൫݊௜
௛ െ ݊௜௟൯ െ 1൧r	,								݅ ൐ ݆ 
ሺ7݅݅ሻ								∆ܩ௜ ൌ 12݊ݕത ൣ൫݊௜
௛ െ ݊௜௟൯ ൅ 1൧r	,								݅ ൏ ݆ 
If we could ignore the -1 and +1 in the square brackets on the right-hand side, (7) would say that 
irrespective of whether i was greater or less than j, a transfer from i to anyone else would increase ܩ௜ if i 
was below the median and reduce ܩ௜ if i was above the median.  This reflects the fact that the main 
impact of the transfer on ܩ௜ is to reduce ܣ௜ and increase ܦ௜.  If ݊௜௛ ൐ ݊௜௟, individual i is below the median 
and from (5) we see that the increase in ܦ௜ will exceed the drop in ܣ௜, since those changes are 
proportional to ݊௜௛ and ݊௜௟ respectively.  If ݊௜௛ ൏ ݊௜௟, individual i is above the median and we have the 
opposite case.  The -1 in (7i) means that the rank at which ∆ܩ௜ switches from being positive to negative as 
we go up the income scale in the ݅ ൐ ݆ case is one position higher than it would otherwise be, since the 
transfer is going to a person with income lower than the “donor” i, which reduces ݕത௜௟ and ܣ௜ a little.  And 
                                                            
5 If we assume only ݕଵ ൑ ݕଶ ൑ ⋯ ൑ ݕ௡ then there could be multiple individuals with median income and the groups 
with income strictly below the median and strictly above the median need not contain an equal number of members.  
Consider for example a population with the set of incomes (1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3).  
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the +1 in (7ii) means that when ݅ ൏ ݆, ∆ܩ௜ switches from positive to negative one position lower than 
would otherwise be the case since the transfer goes to a higher income person, raising ݕത௜௛ and ܦ௜ a little. 
Transfer from j to i:  Here incomes after a transfer are ݕ௜௢ ൅ ݎ and ݕ௝௢ െ ݎ. and we have: 
Proposition 3b:  The effect on ܩ௜	of a small transfer in the amount of r from an individual j to individual 
i is given by: 
ሺ8݅ሻ									∆ܩ௜ ൌ 12݊ݕത ൣ൫݊௜
௟ െ ݊௜௛൯ ൅ 1൧r	,								݅ ൐ ݆ 
ሺ8݅݅ሻ								∆ܩ௜ ൌ 12݊ݕത ൣ൫݊௜
௟ െ ݊௜௛൯ െ 1൧r	,								݅ ൏ ݆ 
Now the main effect of the transfer is to raise ݕ௜ and therefore to increase ܣ௜ and reduce ܦ௜, which is 
equalizing if ݕ௜ is below the median and disequalizing if ݕ௜ is above the median.  Again the point at which 
∆ܩ௜ switches sign as i rises is offset one position by the small impact of the change in ݕ௝ on ܣ௜ when ݅ ൐ ݆ 
and on ܦ௜ when ݅ ൏ ݆.   
Summing up, we can say, somewhat loosely, that an individual perceives a small transfer from himself to 
someone else as equalizing if his income is above the median, and as disequalizing if his income is below 
the median.  If he is the recipient he finds a small transfer equalizing if he is below the median and 
disequalizing if he is above the median.  Thus the situation in Gini-admissible personal inequality 
measurement is quite different from that in the familiar aggregate inequality measurement.  In the latter, 
the impact of a small transfer on inequality is deemed equalizing if the donor’s income exceeds the 
recipient’s and disequalizing if the opposite holds.  In the case of Gini-admissible personal inequality 
measurement, in contrast, whether the transfer is considered equalizing or disequalizing depends almost 
solely on the income of the person making the assessment.  Low income people find making a transfer 
disequalizing and receiving a transfer equalizing.  High income people find the opposite.   
 
III.  Explaining the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to changes in different ranges of the income 
distribution 
From (1) one may derive: 
ሺ9ሻ								ܩ ൌ ଶ௡మ௬ത ሾݕଵ ൅ 2ݕଶ ൅ 3ݕଷ ൅ ⋯൅ ݊ݕ௡ሿ െ
௡ାଵ
௡   
(see e.g. Cowell, 2011, p. 114).  This provides insight into the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to 
changes in different ranges of the income distribution.  Consider a small transfer, r, from individual j to 
individual i where i < j.  This is an example of what would be called an “equalizing transfer” in 
discussions of aggregate inequality.  From (9), this transfer will produce a change in the Gini coefficient 
given by: 
ሺ10ሻ								∆ܩ ൌ ିଶ௥ሺ௝ି௜ሻ௡మ௬ത   
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which also tells us the impact of a transfer from i to j, in which case ݎ ൏ 0.  We see that the impact on the 
Gini coefficient does not depend on ݕ௜ or ݕ௝, but varies only with r and the difference in income ranks 
between i and j.     
The fact that the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to transfers is independent of the incomes of the 
transferor and transferee, but depends on the number of people between them in the distribution is one of 
the most interesting properties of the Gini coefficient. This property follows directly from those of the 
personal inequality index ܩ௜ captured in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 above.  Proposition 1 implies: 
(11݅ሻ							∆ܩ௞ ൌ 0.						݇ ൏ ݅, ݇ ൐ ݆. 
From Proposition 2 we have: 
(11݅݅ሻ							∆ܩ௞ ൌ ି௥௡௬ത .						݅ ൏ ݇ ൏ ݆. 
And from Proposition 3 
(12ሻ							∆ܩ௜ ൌ ሺ௡೔
೗ି௡೔೓ିଵሻ௥
ଶ௡௬ത .										∆ܩ௝ ൌ
ሺ௡ೕ೓ି௡ೕ೗ିଵሻ௥
ଶ௡௬ത 		. 
Now, from (1) and (11i), the change in G resulting from a transfer from j to i is given by: 
ሺ13ሻ												∆ܩ ൌ ଵ௡ ሺ∆ܩ௜ ൅ ∆ܩ௝ ൅ ∑ ∆ܩ௞
௝ିଵ
௞ୀ௜ାଵ ) 
Note first that  
ሺ14ሻ										 ෍ ∆ܩ௞ ൌ െሺ݆ െ ݅ െ 1ሻ ݎ݊ݕത
௝ିଵ
௞ୀ௜ାଵ
 
which is proportional to the number of people between i and j, that is the number of people the transfer 
from j to i “passes over”.   
Next, to complete the analysis of 	∆ܩ, note from (12) that:  
											∆ܩ௜ ൅ ∆ܩ௝ ൌ ሺ௡೔
೗ି௡೔೓ିଵሻ௥
ଶ௡௬ത ൅
ሺ௡ೕ೓ି௡ೕ೗ିଵሻ௥
ଶ௡௬ത   
																															ൌ െݎ2݊ݕത ሾ൫ ௝݊
௟ െ ݊௜௟൯ ൅ ൫݊௜௛ െ ௝݊௛൯ ൅ 2ሿ 
Since ௝݊௟ െ ݊௜௟ and ݊௜௛ െ ௝݊௛ both equal j – i we have: 
ሺ15ሻ						∆ܩ௜ ൅ ∆ܩ௝ ൌ െݎ݊ݕത ሺ݆ െ ݅ ൅ 1ሻ					 
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Hence, like ∆ܩ௞, ∆ܩ௜ ൅ ∆ܩ௝ is proportional to the size of the transfer and rises linearly with the number of 
people between i and j.6   In this case the reason for dependence on the number of people between i and j 
is that the effects of the transfer cancel out for ܣ௜	and ܣ௝ on the one hand, and for ܦ௜	and ܦ௝ on the other, 
where the sums they are based on overlap.  The range of overlap includes all ݇ ൏ ݅ for ܣ௜	and ܣ௝, and all 
݇ ൐ ݆	for ܦ௜	and ܦ௝.  The range where effects that do not cancel out has ݆ െ ݅ ൅ 1 people in it.   
Summing up, substituting (14) and (15) into (13) we have: 
ሺ16ሻ								∆ܩ ൌ െݎ݊ଶݕത ሾሺ݆ െ ݅ ൅ 1ሻ ൅ ሺ݆ െ ݅ െ 1ሻሿ ൌ
െ2ݎሺ݆ െ ݅ሻ
݊ଶݕത  
So we have shown that the mean of the effects on the personal inequality indexes resulting from the 
transfer equals the change in G that one would expect from aggregate inequality analysis.   
The purpose of this exercise has been to show that the effects of a transfer on personal inequality explain 
the impact on G.  That the reaction of G is governed by the number of people between transferor j and 
transferee i is due to two things: (i) aside from i and j themselves, the only people who care about the 
transfer are the individuals between them in the distribution, and (ii) the effects of the transfer on ܩ௜ and 
ܩ௝ cancel out except for those based on changes in income gaps between i or j and individuals in the range 
(i+1, j-1).    
         
IV. Unequal Weighting of Deprivation and Advantage 
Yitzhaki (1979) defined relative deprivation for a society as a whole, D, as the average of individual 
deprivation indexes ܦ௜.  He worked with continuous distributions.  The corresponding relationship with a 
discrete income distribution is: 
ሺ17ሻ							ܦ ൌ 	 1݊෍ܦ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
We can define overall advantage in a parallel way as: 
ሺ18ሻ							ܣ ൌ 	 1݊෍ܣ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
Yitzhaki shows that D is related to the Gini coefficient according to: 
ሺ19ሻ							ܩ ൌ 	ܦݕത  
This result might appear puzzling, given that, from (4΄), ܦ௜ represents only part of an individual’s 
contribution to ܩ௜ and therefore to G.  The explanation is as follows.  The Gini coefficient is proportional 
                                                            
6 Note that the right-hand-side of (15) is not proportional to the number of people between i and j, which is ݆ െ ݅ െ
1.		 
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to the sum of differences, S.   We can arrange the pairwise differences หݕ௜ െ ݕ௝ห making up S in a matrix 
M with i indexing rows and j indexing columns.  D is the mean of the above-diagonal elements of M 
while A is the mean of the below-diagonal elements.  Now, the above-diagonal elements have the same 
mean as the below-diagonal elements in M, since e.g. |ݕଶ െ ݕଵ|  =  |ݕଵ െ ݕଶ|.  Hence A = D.  To get from 
D to S we must therefore double D and multiply by ݊ଶ (to go from an average to a sum).  The same 
procedure could be used to generate S from A.  Thus we have ܵ ൌ 2݊ଶܦ ൌ 2݊ଶܣ or: 
ሺ20ሻ							ܣ ൌ ܦ ൌ ܵ2݊ଶ 
Substituting the expression for D from (20) into (19) we obtain ܩ ൌ ܵ/ሺ2݊ଶݕത) , that is equation (1).     
While Yitzhaki’s approach and ours are closely related, his ܦ௜ and our ܩ௜	are distinct.  ܩ௜ depends not just 
on deprivation, ܦ௜, but also on advantage, ܣ௜.  While, overall, A = D, at the individual level there is no 
such relationship.  ܣ௜	rises and ܦ௜	falls as we move up through the income distribution from ݕଵ to ݕ௡, and 
they do so at rates that rise or fall depending on the shape of the particular income distribution being 
examined.   
The fact that ܣ ൌ ܦ has important consequences for our personal inequality indexes.  Using (19) and 
ܣ ൌ ܦ,  G may be found by taking a weighted average of A and D, as in:  
ሺ21ሻ											ܩ ൌ ߣܣ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻܦݕത 																												0 ൑ ߣ ൑ 1 
where we require the weights to be positive.  This in turn reveals that there is a family of Gini admissible 
personal inequality indexes or GAPIIs of the form: 
ሺ22ሻ											ܩ௜ఒ ൌ ఒ஺೔ାሺଵିఒሻ஽೔௬ത                                0 ൑ ߣ ൑ 1 
Hence, while λ may differ across societies, they can nevertheless agree on using G as an aggregate 
measure of inequality. 7  In the continuous case this result could be generalized to allow λ to differ across 
individuals, as long as the distribution of λ was independent of individual income. 
We may ask which of the results derived above for the λ = ½ case survive once ߣ ് ½ is allowed.  
Proposition 1, which says that the ܩ௜ are insensitive to transfers entirely within the ܪ௜ or ܮ௜ comparator 
groups, survives.  The principle is not affected by re-weighting income differences with the ܪ௜ and ܮ௜       
groups via λ് ½ .  Proposition 2, which says that when income is transferred from those with income 
above (below) ݕ௜ to those with income below (above) ݕ௜ the fall (rise) in ܩ௜ is proportional to the total 
amount transferred, R, and is independent of ݕ௜	is also unaltered because we still have: 
																߲ܣ௜߲ܴ ൌ
߲ܦ௜
߲ܴ ൌ
െ1
݊  
                                                            
7 Note that we are not allowing a negative weight on relative advantage, despite the fact that, as discussed 
previously, a few studies of attitudes toward inequality find disaversion to relative advantage.  Our assumption is in 
the tradition of Yitzhaki (1979, 1982) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and is consistent with significant recent 
experimental and survey evidence (Teyssier, 2012; Cojocaru, 2014).    
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and (6) survives unchanged because in the more general formulation, using (22) we have: 
ሺ6ᇱሻ								߲ܩ௜
ఒ
߲ܴ ൌ
1
ݕത ൤ߣ
߲ܣ௜
߲ܴ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻ
߲ܦ௜
߲ܴ ൨ ൌ െ
1
݊ݕത 
Proposition 3 described the impact on ܩ௜	of making a small transfer from another person to individual i.  
Assuming ݕଵ ൏ ݕଶ ൏ ⋯ ൏ ݕ௡, the conclusion in the λ = ½ case was that, except for a very small region 
around the median, a transfer from a higher income person would reduce ܩ௜if ݕ௜was below the median, 
and increase ܩ௜	if ݕ௜ was above the median.  Converse results held if the transfer came from a lower 
income person.  The critical role of the median arose because with λ = ½, advantage, ܣ௜, and deprivation, 
ܦ௜, are equally weighted.  In general, the critical percentile is given by 1-λ.  Thus, for example if one 
placed half as much weight on ܣ௜ as on ܦ௜, i.e. λ = 1/3, the critical percentile would be 2/3.  That means 
that a small transfer from someone with higher income would be regarded as equalizing by almost 
everyone in the bottom two thirds of the population, but as disequalizing by most of those in the top third.  
This occurs because putting a higher weight on ܦ௜ increases the equalizing impact on ܩ௜ఒ from the fall in 
ܦ௜ caused by such a transfer.    
 
V.  Personal Inequality Assessments at Different Income Levels 
In this section we examine how ܩ௜ఒ varies as ݕ௜ rises from ݕଵ to ݕ௡.  We provide results for the general 
case where λ	can	take	on	any	value	in	the	interval	ሾ0,1ሿ, but note specific conclusions for the case 
where λ ൌ ½ .   
How does	ܩ௜ఒ change as we move up through the distribution of income?  We continue to assume 
ݕଵ ൏ ݕଶ ൏ ⋯ ൏ ݕ௡.  As we go from individual i to i+1, the absolute income gaps in (3) or implicitly in 
(22) increase in value by ݕ௜ାଵ െ ݕ௜ for all j such that ݕ௝ ൏ ݕ௜ , and the corresponding gaps for all j > i fall 
by the same amount.  Hence we should expect that ܩ௜ఒ will initially decline as i rises from 1, since at the 
start there are more people with j > i than with j ≤ i , until some critical point is reached, beyond which ܩ௜ 
should begin to increase.  Formally we have: 
Proposition 4:    If  ݕଵ ൏ ݕଶ ൏ ⋯ ൏ ݕ௡ ,                         
											 ܩ௜ାଵఒ
൐
		ൌ	
൏
		ܩ௜ఒ				as				 ௜௡ 		
൐
ൌ
൏
		1 െ ߣ . 
 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 4 indicates that ܩ௜ఒ falls up to the ሺ1 െ ߣሻ100th percentile of the distribution and increases 
above that.  As indicated above, this U-shaped pattern is based on the fact that moving from income ݕ௜	to 
income ݕ௜ାଵincreases the income gaps with lower income people and reduces those with higher income 
people by the same absolute amount.  The relative impact of changes in the upper gaps compared with 
that of changes in the lower gaps is (1-λ)/λ. This means that ܩ௜ఒ will fall more rapidly starting from i = 1 if 
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λ < ½, compared with the λ = ½ case, and less rapidly if λ > ½.  Note that if ൌ ଵଶ ,  ܩ௜ఒ ൌ ܩ௜ falls up to the 
50th percentile, that is up to the median, and rises thereafter.  
We can also readily identify the value of ܩ௜ఒ	at the bottom and top of the distribution (i = 1 and i = n), as 
well as the value of ܩ௜ఒ for the median individual, ܩ௠௘ௗఒ , if n is odd.  We have: 
Proposition 5:  If ݕଵ ൏ ݕଶ ൏ ⋯ ൏ ݕ௡, 
 
(i)  ܩଵఒ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ1 െ ௬భ௬ത )  
(ii) if n is odd,	ܩ௠௘ௗఒ ൌ ௡ିଵଶ௡௬ത ሾሺ1 െ ߣሻݕത௠௘ௗ௛ െ ߣݕത௠௘ௗ௟ ሿ; if n is even, ܩ௠௘ௗఒ  is not defined, 
(iii)  ܩ௡ఒ ൌ ߣሺ௬೙௬ത െ 1) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Proposition 5 allows us to put upper bounds on ܩଵఒ and ܩ௡ఒ.  If ݕଵ is non-negative, the highest possible 
value of ܩଵఒ is 1 െ ߣ, which occurs when ݕଵ ൌ 0.  When individuals weight deprivation and advantage 
equally, that is when ߣ ൌ ଵଶ, the maximum value is 
ଵ
ଶ.  But the maximum value of ܩଵఒ ranges from 0, when 
λ = 1 and people care only about advantage, to 1 when λ = 0 and people only care about deprivation. In 
view of Proposition 4, these maxima also apply to all ܩ௜ఒ up to the ሺ1 െ ߣሻ100th percentile.8  The upper 
bound on ܩ௡ఒ occurs when one individual has all the income and ݕ௡ ൌ ݊ݕത .  In that case ܩ௡ఒ ൌ ߣሺ݊ െ 1) , 
which is also an upper bound for all ܩ௜ఒ’s above the ሺ1 െ ߣሻ100th percentile.    
 
Part (ii) of the proposition is also interesting, in throwing light on the value of the personal inequality 
index for the “average person”, that is on the value of ܩ௠௘ௗఒ .  The latter is based on a weighted average of 
ݕത௠௘ௗ௛ 	ܽ݊݀	ݕത௠௘ௗ௟ , with the weight on ݕത௠௘ௗ௛  falling with λ.  In the focal case with ൌ 1/2 , we have: 
 
ܩ௠௘ௗ ൌ
ሺ݊ െ 1ሻ
4݊ݕത ሺݕത௠௘ௗ
௛ െ ݕത௠௘ௗ௟ ሻ 
 
Since in any real-world example ሺ݊ െ 1ሻ/݊	 ൎ 1 , this says: 
 
ܩ௠௘ௗ ൎ ݕത௠௘ௗ
௛ െ ݕത௠௘ௗ௟
4ݕത  
In the U.S. today, for household income before tax, ݕത௠௘ௗ௛ ൎ ଼ହ ݕ	ഥ 	and	ݕത௠௘ௗ௟ ൎ
ଶ
ହ, which yields ܩ௠௘ௗ ൎ 0.3 
, less than the value of the Gini coefficient, which was 0.476 in 2013.9  We may also note values of ܩ௠௘ௗ 
under some familiar continuous distributions.  ܩ௠௘ௗ would equal  ଵସ for a uniform distribution, and if ݕ௜ ~ 
N(μ, σ),  it would equal  ଶହ
ఙ
ఓ , that is two-fifths of the coefficient of variation. 
                                                            
8 Note that with λ = 1, the (1 – λ)100th percentile = 0, so that ܩ௜ఒ	has no falling range.  
9 With the help of quintile share and other data from U.S. Census Bureau (2015) it can be estimated that ݕത௠௘ௗ௛ ൌ
1.64ݕ	ഥ 	and	ݕത௠௘ௗ௟ ൌ 0.36ݕ	ഥ .   
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We can see that ܩ௜ఒ	will generally not be symmetric around the median.  Looking at the ߣ ൌ 1/2 case 
again, for example,  ܩ௜ will never be greater than 1/2 at the lowest income level, but can be very high at 
the top end.  ܩ௜ is not bounded on the upper end by 1, unlike the Gini coefficient.  ܩ௡ ൌ 1 is reached 
when ௬೙௬ത ൌ 3 .  That ratio is exceeded in almost all real-world cases.  This implies that, in a mathematical 
sense, the rich perceive that there is more inequality than do the poor when ߣ ൌ 1/2, which is not 
unintuitive.  If you are rich there are relatively few people whose incomes are close to yours, meaning 
there is a large gulf between your income and most others’.   
 
VI.  Personal Inequality During Secular Change in Income Distribution 
This section asks how ܩ௜ఒ can be predicted to behave at different income levels during periods of secular 
change in income distribution.  We focus initially in each case on the  ߣ ൌ 1/2 case, in which individuals 
weight deprivation and advantage equally, referring to ܩ௜ଵ/ଶ simply as ܩ௜, as above. We start with the 
Kuznets transformation and go on to the polarization and  rising inequality that we have seen in the U.S. 
and many other high income countries in the last few decades.  The principles at work are explored with 
the help of examples, which are intended merely to be illustrative.    
Kuznets Transformation 
Kuznets (1955) studied what happens to income distribution and inequality in a growing economy where 
the composition of output is shifting from an initially large traditional agricultural sector to a modern 
sector.  The modern sector eventually comprises most if not all of the economy.   The consequences for 
inequality can be illustrated by considering a stylized model in which individual incomes are uniform 
within each of the sectors, higher in the modern sector, and unchanging during the growth process.10  In 
this case the Gini coefficient, G, rises until the fraction of the population in the modern sector, p, hits a 
critical value, after which it declines.   This critical value of p is less than one half.  That is because, while 
the mean difference has a maximum at  ݌ ൌ 1/2, the mean, which appears in the denominator of the 
expression for G, is rising throughout, so G has already started to decline at ݌ ൌ 1/2. 
The behavior of the GAPIIs, that is the ܩ௜s, and G during the Kuznets transformation will be illustrated 
here using an example whose implications are shown in Figure 1.  It is assumed that income of each 
person in the traditional sector is 11.7% of per capita income in the modern sector.  This gap is sufficient 
for the peak value of G to be 0.49, the value observed in China in 2008 (Li and Sicular, 2014).  China is 
the most prominent recent example of a society going through the kind of transformation that Kuznets 
described.  In the early 1980s its Gini coefficient for family income fluctuated around 0.30 (Sicular, 
                                                            
10 Kuznets considered a richer range of possibilities.  He allowed unequal income distribution within both sectors 
and believed the leading case was one in which there was greater inequality in the modern sector than in the 
traditional, or agricultural, sector.  He also considered the impacts of changes in the relative income, and of income 
inequality, in the modern vs. the agricultural sector over time.  In most cases he found that as the relative population 
of the agricultural sector declined over time there was an initial increase in inequality followed by a decline.     
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2013).  This was followed by a rapid rise with later deceleration to the 2008 peak, after which G began to 
fall slowly. 11  China may now be past a Kuznets curve peak..12 
We will refer to the individual inequality measures of people in the low and high income groups as ܩ௅ 
and ܩு respectively.  Since no one is worse off than those in the low income group, ܩ௅ ൌ ஽ಽ௬ത  , that is it is 
based entirely on deprivation, while ܩு ൌ ஺ಽ௬ത   and is based wholly on advantage.  As shown in Figure 1, 
when the modern sector is tiny, ܩ௅ is not far above zero.  Almost everyone in the society has the same 
low income, so that ݊௅௛/݊ and therefore ܦ௅ are very low. The situation in the modern sector is the 
opposite.  Since almost everyone has much lower income than those in the modern sector, the individual 
inequality measure there, ܩு is very high.  Now, as development proceeds, ܩ௅ rises monotonically and 
ܩு falls monotonically (and dramatically, in the example reflected in Figure 1).  It is as if people in the 
traditional sector become steadily more aware of the inequality between themselves and people in the 
modern sector as the modern sector grows.  On the other hand, from the viewpoint of individuals in the 
modern sector, inequality is falling because more and more of their fellow citizens are as well off as they 
are.    
How does one resolve the conflict when two population groups have such radically opposed views about 
the trend in inequality?  The Gini coefficient proposes a solution - - take an average of the individual 
assessments.  Thus in the Kuznets curve example, G is a population weighted average of the values of ܩ௅ 
and ܩு.  An alternative would be to take a vote on the question of whether inequality was rising or falling 
- - a “democratic” approach.  Here the democratic approach would say that inequality rises until p = ½ 
and falls thereafter.  In the example, G says that inequality rises until p = ¼ and falls thereafter.  That is 
because ܩு falls faster than ܩ௅ rises, so that averaging ܩு and ܩ௅, even using population weights, places 
greater relative importance on the decline in ܩு than on the rise in ܩ௅.  Thus the Gini procedure of 
averaging individual inequality assessments does not correspond to the democratic approach in this 
situation, and places more importance on the views of the wealthy.    
The difference in the views of traditional vs. modern sector people about the trend of inequality during 
development clearly has the potential to create resentment and misunderstanding.  Observers sometimes 
wonder why high income people seem to be unconcerned about what they view as rising inequality in the 
initial stages of development.  The suspicion is perhaps that these people turn a blind eye because they 
benefit from the process.  What we see here is that, from their viewpoint, inequality is actually falling.  
This is their honest assessment.  Hence we have a “perfect storm” - - numerous poor people who think 
inequality is rising and a growing number of rich people who think the opposite.  In the real world such a 
situation could clearly cause tension.     
Our analysis shows that, unfortunately, use of the Gini coefficient could cause confusion about what is 
happening to inequality during the Kuznets transformation due to its greater sensitivity to the views of the 
high income group.  The Gini begins to fall “too soon”.  If the behavior of G were used as an input into 
                                                            
11 The National Bureau of Statistics estimates of the national Gini coefficient for family income were 0.491 in 2008 
(Li and Sicular, 2014, Appendix A) and 0.469 in 2014 (Qi, 2015). 
12Knight (2014) discusses whether China may be beyond the peak of the Kuznets curve.  His conclusion is that this 
depends in part on public policy but that there are now strong underlying forces pushing in the direction of reducing 
inequality in China.  
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policy decisions,  this could potentially lead to a relaxation of inequality-reducing measures in a country 
where the majority of the population had yet to join the modern sector and still felt that inequality was 
rising.      
The above analysis would not be affected significantly by moving from the λ = ½ case to λ ് ½.  There 
would of course be no impact on the time path of G.  Since those in each sector are only concerned either 
about deprivation (in the traditional sector) or advantage (in the modern sector) what occurs at the 
individual level is simply a rescaling of ܩ௅ and ܩு at each point in the Kuznets process.  A  majority of 
people still believe inequality is rising until p = ½ is reached, and above this point the majority think 
inequality is falling.  G still has its peak at the same point as with λ = ½ .  In terms of Figure 1, there will 
be a proportionate shift of the ܩ௅ curve by the factor 2ሺ1 െ ߣሻ and a shift of the ܩு curve in the opposite 
direction by the factor 2ߣ.  In the case where λ < ½  the ܩ௅ and ܩு curves will move towards each other, 
while if λ > ½  the result will be the opposite.  
  
Polarization  
There is much theoretical and empirical literature on polarization (including Foster and Wolfson, 1992; 
Esteban and Ray, 1994; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Green and Sand, 2015).  
Polarization can take different forms.  Without saying so, we have already been discussing one form in 
the context of the Kuznets transformation, which has two poles: the traditional society and the modern 
sector.  At the starting point, with everyone in the traditional sector, there is extreme polarization.  As 
population shifts to the modern sector that polarization initially declines, but aggregate inequality rises 
according to the Gini coefficient, which people in the traditional sector agree with but people in the 
modern sector do not. Then there is a phase where polarization continues to decline but changes in the 
Gini coefficient turn from positive to negative.  Finally, when the modern sector population becomes a 
majority, polarization begins to decrease, as does the Gini coefficient, but inequality continues to rise in 
the view of those in the traditional sector. 
The behavior of polarization, the aggregate Gini coefficient, and personal inequality assessments over the 
course of the Kuznets transformation illustrate two important points about polarization and inequality: 
i)  Polarization and individual inequality assessments may move in opposite directions, 
ii) Polarization and aggregate inequality measures may move in opposite directions. 
It is clear from the Kuznets case alone that the relationship between polarization and inequality is 
complex.  The relationship is even more complex in the case of the polarization in labor markets that has 
received attention in the US and other high income countries in recent years.  In this case the relative 
demand for labor shifts away from mid-level occupations to both low-skilled and (especially) high skilled 
occupations  Other things constant this should result in a shift in labor force composition away from the 
middle earning levels toward both high and low labor incomes.  Such a shift has indeed occurred over 
significant timespans in the U.S., Canada, the UK, Germany and some other European countries 
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Green and Sand, 2015).  In most cases the relative wages of highly skilled 
workers have increased.  In the US it has also been found that the relative wages of certain low skilled 
occupations have risen (Autor and Dorn, 2013).  
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We will analyze the kind of polarization seen over the last few decades in labor markets by first  
considering the effects of population shift, that is a rise in the number of individuals at low and high 
incomes combined with a reduction in the number at middle income.  Subsequently we will look at the 
effect of changes in relative incomes as well.  As in the Kuznets analysis it helps to consider a stylized 
situation.  Assume that there are just three income levels in a society and that they display ݕ௅ ൏ ݕெ ൏ ݕு.  
Numbers of individuals in the three groups are ݊௅, ݊ெ, and	݊ு.  As in the Kuznets case the GAPIIs of 
people in the bottom group and top groups are given by ܩ௅ఒ ൌ ఒ஽ಽ௬ത 	and	ܩுఒ ൌ
ሺଵିఒሻ஺ಹ
௬ത .   
Also as in the Kuznets analysis the increase in ݊ு will tend to make ܣு	and	ܩுఒ increase since (from 5i): 
(23)   ܣு ൌ ሺ௡ಽା௡ಾሻ௡ ሺݕு െ ݕതு௟ ሻ 
However, there is now an offsetting effect because ݕതு௟  falls due to the population shift from the middle to 
lower groups, and therefore ሺݕு െ ݕതு௟ ሻ increases.  It can readily be shown that: 
(24)   ∆ܣு, ∆ܩு	
൐
	ൌ
൏
		0			as			 ∆௡ಽି∆௡ಾ 	
൐
	ൌ		
൏
	௬ಹି௬ಾ௬ಹି௬ಽ  
Now ௬ಹି௬ಾ௬ಹି௬ಽ ൏ 1 and 
∆௡ಽ
ି∆ேಾ ൏ 1 as well, so it is not immediately clear which way the inequality will go.  
However, with a positively skewed distribution of income we would have ௬ಹି௬ಾ௬ಹି௬ಽ ൐
ଵ
ଶ , so that if half or 
fewer of those leaving the middle income group go to the lower group (which is in line with the 
experience in the US at least), ܣு	and	ܩு	will decline, as in the Kuznets case.   
Turning to the bottom group, from (5ii) we have: 
 (25)   ܦ௅ ൌ ሺ௡ಾା௡ಹሻ௡ ሺݕത௅௛ െ ݕ௅ሻ 
And it can be shown that: 
(26)   ∆ܣ௅, ∆ܩ௅	
൐
	ൌ
൏
		0			as			 ି∆௡ಾ∆௡ಹ 	
൐
	ൌ		
൏
	௬ಹି௬ಽ௬ಾି௬ಽ 
Now, ௬ಹି௬ಽ௬ಾି௬ಽ ൐ 1 and 
ି∆௡ಾ
∆௡ಹ ൐ 1 as well, so again there is ambiguity.  Once more appealing to positive 
skewness, ௬ಹି௬ಽ௬ಾି௬ಽ ൐ 2 is likely.  So if half or more of those leaving the middle group go to the top group 
(which is of course the same as saying that half or fewer go to the bottom group, as above), 
ܣ௅	and	ܩ௅	will fall, which is the opposite of what we found in the Kuznets analysis.  This would be the 
result of the increase in ݕത௅௛ having a larger effect on ܣு	and	ܩு	than the decline in ݊௅௛ ൌ ሺ݊ெ ൅ ݊ுሻ.   
The analysis of ܣ௅	and	ܣு	is sufficiently complex that one may (correctly) anticipate that the analysis of 
ܣெ	and	ܩெ	would be tedious.  This is not only because ܩெ	depends on both ܣெ	and	ܦெ	, immediately 
doubling the algebra, but also because for a general analysis allowing λ	് ଵଶ one would need to think 
about how different weightings of ܣெ	and	ܦெ would affect the results.  Clearcut results are hard to get.  
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Suffice it to say that during polarization, population shift alone may increase, decrease, or leave 
unchanged personal inequality as viewed by the middle group. 
What about changes in relative incomes associated with polarization?  A robust finding across countries is 
that the relative income of the highly skilled has risen during observed labor market polarization.  With 
the incomes of the two lower groups assumed unchanged, from (23) we see that this makes it more likely 
that ܣு	and	ܩு would rise with polarization, rather than declining as in the Kuznets analysis.  This effect 
would be strengthend if ݕതு௟  declined, which could occur as a result of ݕெ falling, which is also consistent 
with what is generally observed.  From (25) we can see that a rise in ݕு could also give ܣ௅	and	ܩ௅	more 
of a tendency to increase, via its effect on ݕത௅௛, although that could be offset by a fall in ݕெ	which would 
act to reduce ݕത௅௛. 
Given the theoretical ambiguity of the behavior of ܩ௅, ܩெ, and	ܩு it is helpful to consider an example 
based on real-world observations.  Autor and Dorn (2013) set out the changes in employment shares and 
wage rates for six broad occupational groups in the U.S. from 1980 to 2005.  As shown in Table 1 here, 
the top group, consisting of managers, professionals, technicians, finance and public safety occupations 
experienced a 29% increase in employment share and a 36% rise in wage rates over those years.  The 
middle group shown in Table 1, which aggregates the middle four occupational groups in Autor and Dorn 
(2013), had a 22% drop in employment share and only a 9% increase in wages.  Finally, the bottom 
group, consisting of service occupations, had a 30% rise in employment share and a 17% increase in 
wages.  These changes provide a dramatic example of labor market polarization.  
Table 1 shows ܩ௜	rising for all three groups, as do ܣ௜	and	ܦ௜ where applicable.  The wage gap between 
the top group and the rest of the labor force expands considerably, leading to ܣு	more than doubling from 
1980 to 2005.  The middle group experiences a large increase in deprivation, which is not surprising in 
view of its poor wage performance and the large employment and wage increases for the top group.  But 
the middle group also sees a rise in its advantage over the bottom group, which is due to the increase in 
the relative size of the latter group.  The 17% wage rise of the bottom group is not large enough to 
overcome the deprivation-increasing effect for it of the expansion and large wage increase of the top 
group, so its deprivation increases quite a bit.   
The above results are obtained with ߣ ൌ 1/2, of course.  But changing λ will not produce a direction of 
change in ܩ௜ఒ different from that in ܩ௜, since we do not have a case where either advantage or deprivation 
are falling.  Reweighting ܣ௜	and	ܦ௜ cannot produce a sum that decreases. This result does, however, 
depend on how Autor and Dorn’s original six broad occupational groups are aggregated into three groups. 
Autor and Dorn (2013) stress that the only low wage group that sees a rise in employment share is their 
service occupations group, and that original group has been treated here as the bottom of our three more 
aggregated groups.  However, although the original 1980 group with the second-lowest wage, those in 
clerical and retail sales occupations, has a small drop in employment share, it, like the service 
occupations, shows a relative wage increase.  Thus the clerical and retail sales occupations benefit from 
wage polarization if not from employment polarization.  Again aggregating to three groups, but putting 
clerical and retail sales occupations in the bottom category along with the service occupations, changes 
results a little.  ܩ௅, ܩெ, and	ܩு all increase, but ܣெ falls.  Hence, if λ is sufficiently high, more precisely 
0.72 or more, ܩெ declines between 1980 and 2005.  That is, if the middle group is sufficiently concerned 
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about advantage it will regard polarization as having reduced inequality in this case.   While worth noting, 
this result may not affect one’s conclusions much in view of the broad consensus in the literature that it is 
likely that λ ≤ ½.  
 
Rising Overall Inequality 
In the last four decades substantial periods of rising overall income inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient and other conventional indexes, have been observed in a wide range of high income countries 
(Roine and Waldenström, 2015).  In some cases this reflects polarization, but labelling all increases in 
inequality as polarization would abuse the latter term.  It is probably best to refer to a broadly-based 
downward movement in the Lorenz curve simply as an increase in inequality.   
It is interesting to ask what is likely to happen to personal inequality assessments during a period of rising 
inequality.  Table 2 provides some insight on this question.  Using ߣ ൌ 1/2, it shows ܩ௜ at selected 
percentiles of lognormal income distributions that have overall G = 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6.  These Gini 
values span most of the range observed across countries.  For reference, the Gini coefficient for household 
income in the U.S. was 0.397 in 1975 and rose with little interruption to 0.476 in 2013 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2015).   In the UK the Gini coefficient for equivalized household income was 0.272 in 1977 and 
rose to 0.324 in 2013/14 (Office of National Statistics, 2015, Figure 5).  
Table 2 shows, first, that ܩ௜ falls with income up to the median and then rises, as predicted by Proposition 
4.  The latter increase, from percentile to percentile, rises with income, particularly at the highest levels.  
We see, for example, with an overall Gini of 0.4 that while ܩ௜ approximately doubles, from 0.272 to 
0.586, in going from the median to the 90th percentile, it then roughly triples to arrive at 1.670 for the 99th 
percentile.  Second, the table shows that sensitivity to rising inequality is greatest at top income levels.  
This is more clearly illustrated in Table 3 which shows high income-low income ܩ௜ ratios by percentile, 
given different values of G.   The P90:P10 ܩ௜ ratio rises from 1.62 when G = 0.4 to 1.80 when G =  0.5, 
and the P99:P1 ratio rises from 3.85 when G = 0.4 to 5.36 when G = 0.5.  The increase of G by 0.1, from 
0.4 to 0.5 is roughly similar to the rise seen in the U.S. since 1975, so this is suggestive with respect to 
real-world changes in inequality assessments by people at the top of the income distribution.  Thus these 
results raise the interesting possibility that high income people could have experienced the largest 
perceived increases in inequality in recent decades.   
An idea of the quantitative impact of allowing ߣ ് 1/2 is provided in Tables 4 and 5, which repeat the 
exercises of Table 2 and 3, but with the range of G confined to [0.3,0.5] and alternate values of λ = 0.25 
and 0.75 considered.   Note first that ܩ௜ఒ initially declines as income rises but hits a minimum at the 
ሺ1 െ ߣሻ100th percentile , as predicted by Proposition 4.   Next, we can see that raising λ twists the ܩ௜ఒ 
profile.  For lower incomes, ܩ௜ఒfalls but for higher incomes ܩ௜ఒ rises.  This means that there is an increase 
with λ in the acceleration of ܩ௜ఒ as one goes up the income scale, and a rise in ܩ௜ఒ ratios for such income 
percentiles as P90/P10 and P99/P1 (Table 5). The switch from a negative to positive impact of λ on ܩ௜ఒ 
occurs at P61 for G = 0.3, at P65 for G = 0.4, and at P69 for G = 0.5.   
     
 19 
 
VII. Discussion and Conclusion 
We have seen that recognizing the Gini coefficient as the average of personal inequality indexes generates 
rich results.  This is partly because a wide range of personal viewpoints about inequality measurement are 
“Gini admissible”.  The Gini admissible personal indexes, or GAPIIs, are a weighted average of an 
individual’s deprivation and advantage.  Deprivation is based on the sum of differences between the 
individual’s own income and that of people with higher income, while advantage is based on the sum of 
differences vis-à-vis people with lower income.  Deprivation and advantage are standard concepts in the 
literature on individual attitudes toward inequality.  However, what happens when they are combined to 
form GAPIIs has not been previously investigated. 
One remarkable feature of GAPIIs is that they are completely insensitive to transfers of income that occur 
only among people who have incomes strictly above those of the  reference individual, or among those 
who have incomes strictly below that individual.  This means that GAPIIs do not obey the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers.  But the individual does regard transfers from those in the “above group” to those in 
the “below group” as equalizing while transfers in the other direction are considered disequalizing, as one 
would normally expect. These features help to explain the fact that the sensitivity to transfers of the Gini 
coefficient itself depends critically on the number of people with incomes between those of the donor and 
recipient.  That property can now be seen to result mostly from the fact that the only transfers individuals 
with a GAPII regard as affecting inequality at all, aside from those that alter their own incomes, are 
transfers that “pass over” them. 
Another important aspect is that the relative weights placed on deprivation and advantage can vary across 
societies.   Thus, in one society, people might care only about deprivation - - they may be said to “resent” 
the fact that some others have higher incomes.   In another society, they might only care about advantage 
- - either exulting in being better off than some others or showing concern for “those less fortunate than 
themselves”.  And, of course, any weighting between these extremes may be allowed.  It is tempting to 
imagine that this feature might have something to do with the apparently universal appeal of the Gini 
coefficient.  If everyone agrees with assessing overall inequality by averaging individuals’ inequality 
assessments and that the latter should be based on sums or averages of absolute income differences, 
people in all societies can agree that the Gini coefficient is the appropriate measure of overall inequality, 
even if the weights placed on deprivation and advantage differ across societies.    
The pattern of GPAII values as we go up the income scale is also of interest.  As we have seen, starting 
from the lowest income, the personal index values fall up to a point - - the median when deprivation and 
advantage are weighted equally - -  and then rise.  With the positively skewed income distributions seen 
in the real world, if deprivation is not weighted sufficiently less than advantage, the value of the index 
will rise to a higher level at top incomes than it displays at low income levels.  The paper ended with a 
discussion of how personal inequality assessments may behave during secular changes in income 
distribution.  We have seen, for example, that  in the simplest model people in the traditional sector will 
regard inequality as rising throughout the Kuznets transformation, while those in the modern sector think 
precisely the opposite.  The resulting scope for misunderstanding and conflict seems large.  This may 
throw some light on the tensions that are observed during periods of rapid modernization and rural-urban 
migration in developing countries.  A further insight comes from the fact that the Gini coefficient says 
that the Kuznets transformation stops being disequalizing well before half the population is in the modern 
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sector.  This signals that the fact that the Gini is the average of the personal inequality values does not 
imply that it is democratic in its judgements.  The reason it is not democratic is that higher income people 
tend to have numerically larger personal inequality assessments, so that changes in their assessments have 
more influence on the average than do changes for lower income people.  
Less clearcut results than those found for the Kuznets transformation are obtained for polarization.  Under 
polarization, population shifts not only to the top but also to the bottom, with a shrinking middle group.  
Complex changes in relative incomes can also occur.  The result is that there are circumstances under 
which people in each of the top, middle and bottom income groups may regard inequality as rising, and 
others in which they may all think it is falling, or may have mixed assessments.  Given this ambiguity we 
turned to the real world for some guidance.  In a three-group example set up to parallel the actual 
polarization seen in the U.S. over the period 1980 – 2005, we saw that personal inequality rose from the 
viewpoint of all three groups in a base case.  However, broadening the bottom group led to the result that 
the middle group could have regarded inequality as falling if it placed a sufficiently high weight on 
advantage compared with deprivation.  
Finally, we examined the impact of a general spreading of the income distribution by seeing how rising 
dispersion of a lognormal distribution would affect personal inequality assessments.  Such a trend raises 
personal inequality values at all levels of income irrespective of the relative weights placed on deprivation 
and advantage.  However it does not do so equally.  Unless sufficiently more weight is placed on 
deprivation, the increase in inequality is greatest from the viewpoint of those with the highest incomes.  
Could this help to explain why rising inequality has begun to get so much attention recently in the global 
financial media and such quarters as the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos?   It is 
an intriguing question.  
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Table 1 
Advantage, Deprivation and Personal Inequality Indexes with λ = 1/2, by Occupation Group - - 
Polarization Example Based on U.S. Data, 1980 and 2005  
I. 1980 
Occupation 
Group 
Employment 
Share 
Mean Wage 
(2004 $s) ࡭࢏ ࡰ࢏ ࡳ࢏ 
1. Top 0.316 17.0 3.42 0 0.126 
2. Middle 0.585 12.6 0.44 1.38 0.067 
3. Bottom 0.099 8.2 0 5.36 0.198 
II. 2005 
Occupation 
Group  
Employment 
Share 
Mean Wage
(2004 $s) ࡭࢏ ࡰ࢏ ࡳ࢏ 
1. Top 0.409 23.1 6.11 0 0.226 
2. Middle 0.462 13.7 0.53 3.86 0.162 
3. Bottom 0.129 9.6 0 7.41 0.274 
  Notes: (i) The mean wage is the geometric mean hourly wage, derived from the mean log hourly 
 wage reported by Autor and Dorn (2013). 
 (ii) The Top occupational group is the first category in Autor and Dorn (2013). It  includes 
 managers, professionals, technicians, finance and public safety occupations. 
 The Middle occupational group consists of the four middle groups in Autor and Dorn (2013):    
 production and craft occupations; transportation, construction, mechanics, mining and farm 
 occupations; machine operators and assemblers; and clerical and retail sales occupations. 
 The Bottom occupational group consists of service occupations.     
 (iii) ܣ௜, ܦ௜, and	ܩ௜ are the personal advantage, deprivation, and inequality indexes.  
 Source: Employment share and mean wage are from Autor and Dorn (2013, Table 1) - - see Note 
 (i).   The other columns are from calculations by the author.  
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Table 2 
Personal Inequality Indexes with ࣅ ൌ ૚૛,		by Overall Gini Coefficient and Percentile,  
Lognormal Example 
Overall Gini: 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Percentile: 
1 0.297 0.380 0.434 0.467 0.486 
5 0.244 0.328 0.392 0.437 0.468 
10 0.213 0.295 0.362 0.414 0.452 
25 0.165 0.240 0.307 0.366 0.415 
50 0.140 0.208 0.272 0.331 0.385 
75 0.175 0.261 0.342 0.415 0.476 
90 0.273 0.427 0.586 0.743 0.886 
95 0.362 0.591 0.850 1.135 1.431 
99 0.585 1.048 1.670 2.502 3.608 
 
 
Table 3 
Ratios of Personal Inequality Indexes for Selected Percentiles with ࣅ ൌ ૚/૛, Lognormal Example 
Overall Gini: 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
P60/P40 1.004 1.006 1.007 1.008 1.009 
P70/P30 1.030 1.044 1.056 1.065 1.070 
P75/P25 1.059 1.087 1.112 1.132 1.146 
P80/P20 1.103 1.155 1.204 1.247 1.277 
P90/P10 1.281 1.444 1.618 1.795 1.960 
P95/P5 1.483 1.799 2.171 2.596 3.060 
P99/P1 1.968 2.757 3.850 5.361 7.430 
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Table 4 
Personal Inequality Indexes by Overall Gini Coefficient and Percentile with Alternative Values of λ, 
Lognormal Example 
λ = 0.25  λ = 0.75 
Overall Gini:  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.5 
Percentile: 
     
1  0.570  0.650  0.700  0.190  0.217  0.233 
5  0.491  0.586  0.655  0.166  0.197  0.219 
10  0.439  0.539  0.618  0.152  0.185  0.210 
25  0.341  0.443  0.533  0.139  0.172  0.199 
50  0.242  0.332  0.423  0.173  0.211  0.240 
75  0.199  0.278  0.361  0.322  0.406  0.468 
90  0.242  0.342  0.449  0.611  0.830  1.037 
95  0.311  0.452  0.613  0.870  1.248  1.656 
99  0.528  0.843  1.266  1.567  2.496  3.739 
Note: λ is the weight placed on relative advantage, ܣ௜, in the calculation of the personal inequality index, 
ܩ௜.  See text.  
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Table 5 
Ratios of Personal Inequality Indexes for Selected Percentiles with Alternative Values of λ, 
Lognormal Example 
λ = 0.25  λ = 0.75 
Overall Gini:  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.5 
P60/P40  0.787  0.811  0.837  1.406  1.401  1.382 
P70/P30  0.636  0.674  0.717  1.965  1.974  1.949 
P75/P25  0.584  0.627  0.677  2.320  2.358  2.353 
P80/P20  0.549  0.599  0.656  2.747  2.847  2.897 
P90/P10  0.552  0.634  0.727  4.016  4.487  4.941 
P95/P5  0.633  0.772  0.936  5.252  6.329  7.548 
P99/P1  0.927  1.296  1.808  8.239  11.506  16.015 
Note: λ is the weight placed on relative advantage, ܣ௜, in the calculation of the personal inequality index, 
ܩ௜.  See text. 
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 Appendix  
This appendix provides proofs of propositions 4 and 5.  
Proposition 4:    If  ݕଵ ൏ ݕଶ ൏ ⋯ ൏ ݕ௡ ,                         
											 ܩ௜ାଵఒ
൐
	ൌ
൏
		ܩ௜ఒ				as				 ௜௡ 	
൐
ൌ
൏
	1 െ ߣ . 
Proof:  From (4΄), (5) and (22), and using the assumption that ݕଵ ൏ ݕଶ ൏ ⋯ ൏ ݕ௡ ,  ܩ௜ାଵఒ
൐
	ൌ
൏
		ܩ௜ఒ as:  
ሺA1ሻ										ߣ෍൫ݕ௜ାଵ െ ݕ௝൯ ൅
௜
௝ୀଵ
	ሺ1 െ ߣሻ ෍ ൫ݕ௝ െ ݕ௜ାଵ൯
௡
௝ୀ௜ାଶ
൐
	ൌ
൏
		ߣ෍൫ݕ௜ െ ݕ௝൯
௜ିଵ
௝ୀଵ
൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻ ෍ ൫ݕ௝ െ ݕ௜൯
௡
௝ୀ௜ାଵ
 
Now, the left-hand side of this expression can be written: 
(A2)										ߣൣ∑ ൫ݕ௜ െ ݕ௝൯௜ିଵ௝ୀଵ ൅ ݅ሺݕ௜ାଵ െ ݕ௜ሻ൧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻሾ∑ ൫ݕ௝ െ ݕ௜൯ ൅ ሺ݊ െ ݅ሻሺ௡௝ୀ௜ାଵ ݕ௜ െ ݕ௜ାଵሻሿ 
Hence, (A1) simplifies to: 
               ߣ	݅ሺݕ௜ାଵ െ ݕ௜ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ݊ െ ݅ሻሺݕ௜ െ ݕ௜ାଵሻ	
൐
	ൌ
൏
	0 
which is equivalent to: 
																ߣ	݅ െ ሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ݊ െ ݅ሻ	
൐
	ൌ
൏
	0 
which becomes: 
														ߣ݊ ൅ ݅ െ ݊	
൐
	ൌ
൏
	0 
from which one readily derives the result that 
													ܩ௜ାଵఒ
൐
	ൌ
൏
		ܩ௜ఒ				as				
݅
݊ 	
൐
ൌ
൏
	1 െ ߣ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
Proposition 5:  If ݕଵ ൏ ݕଶ ൏ ⋯ ൏ ݕ௡, 
 
(i)  ܩଵఒ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ1 െ ௬భ௬ത )  
 
(ii) if n is odd,	ܩ௠௘ௗఒ ൌ ௡ିଵଶ௡௬ത ሾሺ1 െ ߣሻݕത௠௘ௗ௛ െ ߣݕത௠௘ௗ௟ ሿ; if n is even, ܩ௠௘ௗఒ  is not defined, 
(iii)  ܩ௡ఒ ൌ ߣሺ௬೙௬ത െ 1) 
Proof:  (i)  From (5) and (22), given that ݊ଵ௟ ൌ 0, 
								ܩଵఒ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣሻ݊ݕത ሾ݊ଵ
௛൫ݕതଵ௛ െ ݕଵ൯ሿ 
													ൌ 	 ሺ1 െ ߣሻ݊ݕത ሾ෍ݕ௝ െ ሺ݊ െ 1ሻݕଵሿ
௡
௝ୀଶ
 
												ൌ 	 ሺ1 െ ߣሻ݊ݕത ሺ෍ݕ௝ െ ݊ݕଵሻ
௡
௝ୀଵ
 
													ൌ 	 ሺ1 െ ߣሻ݊ݕത ሺ݊ݕത െ ݊ݕଵሻ 
													ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ1 െ ݕଵݕത ሻ 
(ii)  From (5) and (22), if n is odd we have: 
									ܩ௠௘ௗఒ ൌ
ߣ
݊ݕത ݊௠௘ௗ
௟ ൫ݕ௠௘ௗ െ ݕത௠௘ௗ௟ ൯ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߣሻ
݊ݕത ݊௠௘ௗ
௛ ൫ݕത௠௘ௗ௛ െ ݕ௠௘ௗ൯ 
Noting that ݊௠௘ௗ௟ ൌ ݊௠௘ௗ௛ ൌ ௡ିଵଶ  , 
									ܩ௠௘ௗఒ ൌ
݊ െ 1
2݊ݕത ሾሺ1 െ ߣሻݕത௠௘ௗ
௛ െ ߣݕത௠௘ௗ௟ ሿ 
If n is even there is no individual with median income since ݕଵ ൏ ݕଶ ൏ ⋯ ൏ ݕ௡ . 
(iii) From (5) and (22), given that ݊௡௛ ൌ 0, 
								ܩ௡ ൌ ߣ݊ݕത ሾ݊௡
௟ ൫ݕ௡ െ ݕത௡௟ ൯ሿ 
													ൌ 	 1݊ݕത ሾሺ݊ െ 1ሻݕ௡ െ෍ݕ௝ሿ
௡ିଵ
௝ୀଵ
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												ൌ 	 ߣ݊ݕത ሾ݊ݕ௡ െ෍ݕ௝ሿ
௡
௝ୀଵ
 
													ൌ 	 ߣ݊ݕത ሾ݊ݕ௡ െ ݊ݕതሿ 
													ൌ 	ߣሾݕ௡ݕത െ 1ሿ 
 
 
 
 
